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This paper presents a simple model to show how distributional concerns can engender 
social conflict. We have a two period model, where the cost of conflict is endogenous in 
the sense that parties involved have full control over how much conflict they can create. 
We find that anticipated future inequality plays a crucial role in determining the level of 
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that the link between inequality and conflict may be non-monotonic. 
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This paper presents a simple model showing how distributional concerns
can engender social con￿ ict. We focus on the phenomena of intra-state
con￿ ict that has become common in recent years (Stewart et al. 2001). It
is usually manifested in terms of widescale demonstrations, protests, strikes
and sometimes violent rebellions, leading to severe disruption of economic
activity.1 This can weaken a country￿ s institutions and severely impede its
economic progress. In fact, many of the states in the poorest regions of
the world, have gone through serious intra-state con￿ ict in the recent past.
From this one may be tempted to deduce that when countries are very poor,
the competition over resources can be intense, eventually leading to serious
con￿ ict. While this may be true, not all countries that have su⁄ered serious
con￿ ict have mass destitution. For instance, Sri Lanka, which has gone
through serious con￿ ict all through the last two decades, ranks highly when
it comes to quality of life indicators such as life expectancy and literacy.2
Although it is possible that con￿ ict may exacerbate the existing levels of
poverty and inequality, the object of this paper is to investigate the causal
role of inequality in fostering con￿ ict. This has been emphasized in a
number of recent papers. MacCullouch (2001), after controlling for several
factors such as income, military expenditure and country and time speci￿c
e⁄ects, do ￿nd that higher inequality can lead to higher con￿ ict. Nafziger
and Auvinen (2000) using an improved inequality data set and a broader
de￿nition of con￿ ict ￿nd a strong link between inequality and war. Other
studies such as Alesina and Perrotti (1996), Cramer (2003), World Bank
(2003), point to economic inequality as an important cause of con￿ ict.3
1See Nafziger et al. (2000) and Sachs (1989).
2Sri Lanka has su⁄ered from serious ethno-religious con￿ ict between the Sinhalese
majority and the Tamil minority since the early eighties. For details about the insurgency
in Sri Lanka refer to: http://www.onwar.com.
3Collier and Hoe› er (2000) does not ￿nd any signi￿cant impact of inequality on con-
￿ ict. However, for the problems with their paper refer to Cramer (2003) and Nafziger
1We provide a theoretical framework to analyze the link between inequal-
ity and con￿ ict. In particular our emphasis is on wealth inequality and con-
￿ ict. In mainly agrarian economies, for example, land inequality closely re-
￿ ects wealth inequality and the distribution of land can be a source of discon-
tent. In Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala,
strong reliance on agro based exports led to an extremely disproportionate
amount of land in the hands of a few rich and powerful interests. This re-
sulted in serious con￿ ict with those who have been dispossessed (Brockett,
1988). But inequality in assets is not just limited to land inequality. One
of the important reasons for con￿ ict in Angola and the D.R. Congo was for
the control of the natural resources.4 The share (or the lack of share) of
the di⁄erent groups in these resources can be seen as the source of asset
inequality.
The emphasis on this asset based inequality does not in any way reduce
the importance of other factors, historical, ethnic or religious, in creating
con￿ ict. In fact our analysis presumes the polarization of a society into rival
groups. How these groups are formed and the ensuing tensions between
them are essential part of any description of con￿ ict. We take these group
formations as given.5 Instead, the question that we address here is, given
an already bifurcated society, what sparks the con￿ ict? This is where asset
inequality comes to bear.
To demonstrate how inequality and con￿ ict are interlinked, we use a two
period repeated game framework which is similar to Gar￿nkel and Skaper-
das (2000) and Skaperdas and Syropoulous (1996). However, unlike those
models, the groups directly choose the level of con￿ ict, rather than choos-
ing between productive and defensive activities.6 Another di⁄erence with
and Auvinen (2002, p.156).
4￿ Q&A: D R Congo Con￿ ict￿ , B.B.C News, December 15, 2004 and ￿ Country Pro￿le:
Angola￿ , B.B.C News, May 3, 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk.
5For the dynamics of group formations see Gar￿nkel (2004a, 2004b).
6Addison et al.(2003) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) also take a similar approach.
2the previous papers lie in how the joint output is distributed. In standard
choice theoretic models, the share of each group depends on the amount of
resources the groups invest in enhancing their relative capability to capture
a larger share of the output. In contrast, we presume an underlying so-
cial contract between the groups when it comes to the distribution of joint
outputs. This contract may be arrived at through some bargaining process
between the groups. In this sense our model is closer to Bannerjee and
Du￿ o (2000) and Rodrik (1998).
The shares of the groups, in our model, depend on the relative levels of
wealth. If a group is relatively wealthy, then presumably it can have more
leverage in the bargaining and thus be able to appropriate a larger share
of the output. The current level of wealth inequality is then re￿ ected in a
more skewed distribution of income in the future. Whilst Skaperdas and
Syropoulous (1997) discusses distributional issues in the context of con￿ ict,
it is in a static framework. Also, unlike their model, ours does not allow
con￿ ict in the absence of inequality.7 Further, one of the features of their
model is that, groups with higher appropriative capabilities enjoy a larger
share of the output. By specifying a stable social contract through the
distribution rule, our model refrains from such an anarchic situation.
Yet we are able to demonstrate how wealth inequality can tip a peaceful
society to con￿ ict. We go on to show that even if wealth and income was
equally shared, con￿ ict may still arise, so long as there was a possibility of
future inequality. Taking the analysis further, we argue that con￿ ict just
does not simply increase with inequality and the disadvantaged groups are
not the only one to engage in con￿ ict. At higher levels of inequality both the
advantaged and the disadvantaged groups may engage in con￿ ict which is
what we often see when repressive measures are undertaken by (governments
7In a similar context, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) presents a dynamic model, but
they also allow for con￿ ict under perfect equality. Further, unlike ours, the groups in
their paper do not incur any cost in the current period to initiate con￿ ict.
3aligned to) the advantaged group to suppress the con￿ ict initiated by the
disadvantaged group. We also ￿nd that there are discontinuities in the link
between inequality and con￿ ict. Our model, therefore, provides a plausible
explanation as to why countries with inequality levels close to each other
may exhibit drastically di⁄erent levels of con￿ ict. More interestingly as
inequality rises the potential increase in con￿ ict may be high enough to
act as an disincentive for groups to participate in production processes, the
sharing of the output of which is the main source of con￿ ict. In fact we
show that the link between inequality and con￿ ict is non-monotonic8.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe
the basic structure of the model used in the paper including the production
technology, the consumption decisions made by the groups, the social con-
tract and the stages of the game between the groups. Section 3, we focus
on the initiation of con￿ ict. In particular which group engages in con￿ ict
￿rst and what triggers the con￿ ict. In Section 4, we analyze in detail how
future inequality and current levels of con￿ ict may be related. The follow-
ing section discusses some extensions of the model and Section 6 concludes
the paper with some discussion about the policy implications of our results.
2 Model: Basic Framework
2.1 Production
Consider two groups, i and j, involved in production of an output over two
time periods, t and t + 1. The groups either decide to produce the output
jointly or to produce on their own. In the beginning of period t groups i
and j are endowed with wealth wi
t and w
j
t respectively. Each period the
groups are also endowed with one unit of indivisible human capital. Let
8In a paper, recently brought to our attention, Milante (2004) also ￿nds a non-
monotonic relation between wealth inequality and con￿ ict. However the structure of
the model and the general result di⁄er signi￿cantly from ours.
4hm
t 2 f0;1g represent the level of human capital used for joint production
by any group m.













t , and human capital (1 ￿ hm
t ), are used as inputs.
For the joint production case, we assume that the groups divide a given














We would assume that Rt ￿ wi
t + w
j
t, that is, the joint output is far
greater than the combined total of each groups own production. Both
groups receive a part of the joint output according to some distribution
rule, which is discussed next.
2.2 Social Contract
Social contract or the sharing rule is of crucial importance in any con￿ ict
model. This paper, will not be an exception in that regard. In the litera-
ture, the distribution rule (know as ￿ contest success functions￿ ) is a propor-
tional sharing rule, with an emphasis on a winner-takes-all feature. This
kind of sharing rule is appropriate in analyzing situations of war, where there
is an element that the victor commands all the resources. However, most
con￿ ict that we see today, are intra-state con￿ ict, be it peaceful protests
9We could on the other hand, allow the joint output to depend on the current wealth
levels. In that case, however, we will have to rule out sequential investments. This
means that in period t if the parties decide to produce jointly, they invest their wealth
in the joint production. The output in period t then depends on the total level of wealth
invested. In the next period, in case of joint output, there will be no need for additional
investments.
5or civil war. In those cases the winner-takes-all feature may not be ap-
propriate. In such circumstances, we may ￿nd the loser still getting some
share of the resources, albeit, a very small share. This is a highly desirable
property, especially for con￿ ict situations and not all distribution rules share
that property (Hirshleifer, 1989).
Keeping this in mind, we propose the ￿ split-the-di⁄erence￿sharing rule,10
di
t = Y i
















the di⁄erence in the wealth between the groups. Equal levels of wealth,
will result in equal distribution of the pie. Note that both groups have
equal bargaining power under this sharing rule, but more general rules can
be used.
2.3 Con￿ ict
While both the groups have some control over the production aspect (in the
sense that they can choose between joint and own production), they have
little control over the sharing rule of the joint output. In such a case, if group
i is unhappy with its share of the joint output, di
t, it can resort to con￿ ict.
This can take the form of destruction of the other groups share. There is
no direct appropriation of the opponents share. Our model, therefore, does
not discuss looting11.
However, when one group indulges in con￿ ict, it not only harms their




t represent the level of con￿ ict engaged by group i and j respectively
10This is the same as the Nash Bargaining Solution with equal bargaining power, which
has easy intuitive interpretations and strong axiomatic foundation (Muthoo, 1999).
11Refer to Azam (2002) for a model that includes looting.
6in time t. The net income of the groups will be
yi













where k < 1 re￿ ects limited self damage. Further, we assume that no group
has the ability to destroy each others initial level of wealth. It may be that
initial levels of wealth are better protected than their respective shares from
the joint output. Hence if own production takes place then net income of








The total amount of con￿ ict in period t in the society, denoted by nt,
should involve some aggregation of the level of con￿ ict by both groups.
Although, di⁄erent aggregation rules are possible, in this paper we consider
the ￿ additive￿aggregation rule, where the total con￿ ict is the sum of the





2.4 Consumption and Savings
Both groups choose a level of consumption (and therefore a certain level of
savings) and a level of con￿ ict each period, to maximize the group￿ s lifetime
utility. The groups, however, have to incur a mobilization cost for engaging
in con￿ ict. The cost of mobilization increases at an increasing rate with






























t+1 ￿ 0; (10)
where cm
t and sm
t are the level of consumption and savings for group m







mobilization cost of con￿ ict.
Wealth in period t + 1 for group m is
wm
t+1 = rm:sm





where rm is the interest factor on the gross savings in period t. These rms
refer to di⁄erential opportunities each group faces. For example, the interest
factors may well depend on people￿ s talents and abilities, or di⁄erential
access to asset markets, or sheer good fortune. This heterogeneity will be
the crucial element which will drive the con￿ ict in this paper. Here, we
will refer to the di⁄erence in the interest factors between the groups as the
wealth inequality in t + 1. For most of the paper we will assume, without
loss of generality, that group j is the fortunate (or the advantaged) group
and group i is the unfortunate (or the disadvantaged) group. Therefore,









t, then I = (r
j ￿ r
i) is a monotonic function of the Gini
coe¢ cient (G), i.e. I = f(G) and f
0 > 0.
82.5 The Game
Recall that the distribution rule is ￿xed for the whole game. Hence it is a
two period game with each period consisting of the following two stages:
Stage 1: Knowing the distribution, the groups can decide either to pro-
duce on their own (hi
t = 0; or h
j
t = 0), or to produce jointly (hi




Stage 2: If they decide to produce jointly, then each party decides on
the level of con￿ ict, that is, (ni
t and ni









t ) represent the equilibrium level of con￿ ict and hi￿
t ; and h
j￿
t
represent the equilibrium human capital input of group i and j respectively
for the joint output.













p )), p = t; t+1 such that each players choice is
a best response to the other player and satis￿es sequential rationality.
We shall use the backward induction approach to ￿nd the subgame per-
fect equilibrium of the game.
3 Who Initiates Con￿ ict and Why?
In this section we investigate which of the two groups, the disadvantaged
(group i) or the advantaged (group j), initiates the con￿ ict. The advantaged
group may initiate con￿ ict because it is more ￿ greedy￿ . On the other hand
the disadvantaged group may engage in con￿ ict because of genuine ￿ griev-
ances￿ . The central hypothesis in this section is that con￿ ict may arise out
of anticipated future inequality rather than current inequality. We start by
establishing the conditions under which neither of the groups will engage in
con￿ ict and then derive the levels of inequality that leads to con￿ ict.
9First we show that in the most general case the groups will not engage
in con￿ ict in the ￿nal period irrespective of the level of inequality.
Proposition 1 No group will engage in con￿ict in the last period.




















t+1 = (1=2)(Rt+1 +wi
t+1 ￿w
j
t+1) (using (3) and (4)). From the ￿rst





= ￿1 < 0,
which implies ci
t+1 = yi
















t+1 = 0. Similarly for group j. Q.E.D.
What about con￿ ict in period t? For analytical tractability we will
start with the assumption that for both groups savings in proportional to
the level of income, i.e. st = ￿:yt,13 where ￿ ￿ (1=2). We investigate the
condition under which group i and j will initiate con￿ ict in period t, if joint
output is produced.







￿ ri), and group







￿ rj) where ￿ =
(1￿￿)
￿:￿ > 0.
13This is not a very restrictive assumption since similar conditions can be derived from
the model without a⁄ecting the results. Suppose r
j ￿ r
i. So long as ￿:r
i ￿ 1 (i.e.
marginal future gain from saving outweighs the marginal loss of current consumption)













t ￿ c. It can be checked that the results
that follow under the assumption st = ￿:yt for both groups, will also go through for these
alternative speci￿cation.
10Proof: First let us take the case of group i. Since ni
t+1 = n
j




t+1 = 0 (from Proposition 1), in period t, group i will choose ni
t
such that it maximizes the following:























































































t = 0, in the above equations, the conditions under























￿:￿ > 0. Q.E.D.
To have a better understanding of the conditions under which groups
will initiate con￿ ict, (13), we shall discuss some relevant scenarios. First
we discuss the case when there is perfect equality both in the current and
the future period. Next we derive the conditions for the case where there
is perfect equality in the current period but inequality in the future period.
11The third discussion is centered on inequality in both the current and the
future period and ￿nally we discuss the case of inequality in the current
period but not in the future.
For simplicity we assume the proportion of ￿ self-damage￿k = (1=2) and
normalize group is interest rate ri = 1. Under this assumption, when there
is full equality (i.e. rj = ri = 1 and wi
t = w
j
t), one can interpret ￿ (or more
appropriately the inverse of ￿) as a virtual discount factor: present loss from
saving against future bene￿t from higher consumption.
Corollary 1 Under full equality neither group engages in con￿ict if ￿ >
(1=2).
Corollary 1 directly follows from (13) under the assumptions of full equal-
ity. Q.E.D.
To understand the impact of the current and future wealth inequality on
con￿ ict, we must ensure that atleast when both current and future wealth
are equal there is no con￿ ict in our model. Since the savings rate, ￿ ￿ (1=2),
implies ￿ ￿ 1, in our model, none of the groups will engage in con￿ ict under
current and future equality.
Let us continue to assume that in the current period there is no wealth
inequality. However, due to some anticipated shock,14 group j earns a higher
rate of interest on the savings, relative to group i, i.e. rj > ri. Given other
things remaining the same, this will mean that there will be inequality in
period (t + 1) only, and group j will be the wealthier group. Note that
the future wealth inequality is driven by the di⁄erence in the rate of returns
accruing to each group, i.e. I = (rj ￿ ri). We will show that when the
inequality is high enough, it will be bene￿cial for group i to initiate con￿ ict
in period t. Note that here we are talking about which group will initiate
the con￿ ict, the presumption being that there is no con￿ ict to begin with.
14The shock is fully anticipated by both groups in our model. We later discuss the case
where the shocks may not be fully anticipated.
12Corollary 2 Let wi
t = w
j
t = 0 . Group i will prefer to initiate con￿ict in
period t if the inequality is substantial, that is, I > ￿ ￿ (1=2), where ￿ > 0.
There will be no con￿ict in period (t + 1).
The condition for group i easily follows from (13). From Corollary 1 we
know that group j will not initiate con￿ ict when rj = ri = 1. Therefore,
when rj > 1, given that ￿ > 1, it will be the case that group j will not
initiate con￿ ict in period t. Q.E.D.
In this case, even though there was equality in period t, a situation of
con￿ ict still arose. The disadvantaged group anticipated that in period
t+1, the other group will have higher wealth and hence will receive a larger
share of the joint output. Therefore, it was in the interest of the group with
anticipated lower wealth in period t + 1, to engender con￿ ict in the ￿rst
period so as to reduce the other group￿ s bargaining advantage.15 This is
similar to Skaperdas and Syropoulous (1996) where they show that in the
presence of ￿ strategic time dependence￿ ,16 future concerns can reduce coop-
eration in the current period. Notice that the anticipated future inequality
as such may not lead to con￿ ict. The di⁄erence has to be high enough to
make it worthwhile for the disadvantaged group to initiate con￿ ict.




t. Given this, we discuss two cases: (a) where rates of return
on savings are the same across groups and (b) where the rates of return
vary such that both groups have the same level of wealth in period t + 1.
The ￿rst case re￿ ects the point that the initial wealth inequality is carried
through in period t + 1. In fact, if the rate of return on the savings are
positive, then the wealth inequality in the next period will be magni￿ed.
The second case looks into where the rates of return are such that it acts as
15Hirshleifer (1991) and Durham et al. (1998) also ￿nd that the disadvantaged group
initiates the con￿ ict.
16In our model, the time dependence comes through the savings in the current period,
which translates in to wealth in the next period and that determines the next period share
of the output.
13a mitigating factor for future inequality. Therefore in the second case we
have a situation where there is inequality in the current period but there is
no future inequality.
First consider the case where the rate of returns will be the same whereas
there is wealth inequality to begin with. Since rj = ri this implies that in




Corollary 3 Given w
j
t > wi
t, group i will not initiate con￿ict if the joint
production technology is highly e¢ cient. Otherwise, there is a possibility
that group i will initiate con￿ict.
Suppose the joint product Rt is large enough for (d
j
t=di
t) ’ 1. Then
given rj = ri = 1, and k = (1=2), from (13) we get that for group i to
initiate con￿ ict in this situation, ￿ < (1=2), which violates the condition of
Corollary 1. Hence there will be no con￿ ict in this situation. However, if
Rt is not large enough, then w
j
t > wi
t, will imply (d
j
t=di
t) > 1 which from
(13) one can show will lead to lead group i to initiate con￿ ict. Q.E.D.
Finally consider the case where wealth inequality exists in the ￿rst period
but not in the future periods, i.e. w
j
t > wi




t+2.17 Irrespective of the level of inequality in the current period, we will
show here that, in the absence of future inequality there may not be any
con￿ ict in the society.






t+1. There will be no con￿ict in
the society.











This means there will be no gains in the future from engaging in con￿ ict in
the current period. We also know that con￿ ict in the current period has
17Notice that r
i and r









we will be able to ￿nd (r
i;r





14a mobilization cost and further results in a decrease in consumption in the
current period. Hence none of the groups will have an incentive to engage
in con￿ ict in the current periods. Therefore ni
t = n
j
t = 0. Q.E.D.
What the above corollary clearly show is that initial inequality does not
play any role in engendering con￿ ict. What matters is anticipated future
inequality. Therefore, a high inequality today will not lead to con￿ ict as
long as in the future the inequality in reduced. Hence standard empirical
exercises may ￿nd that current inequality does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect con-
￿ ict, but it will be wrong to infer that inequality plays no role in fostering
con￿ ict. In fact it is quite the opposite. In this situation, unlike Gar￿nkel
and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas and Syropoulous (1996), in presence of
￿ strategic time dependence￿ , the ￿ long shadow￿of the future can help reduce
con￿ ict and increase cooperation.
4 Future Inequality and Equilibrium Level of Cur-
rent Con￿ ict
Future inequality plays a key role, since in its absence, there will be no
con￿ ict. The previous section mainly dealt with the issue of whether con￿ ict
will be initiated or not. In this section we demonstrate the link between
future inequality and con￿ ict in more depth. Speci￿cally we are interested
to know what happens to the level of con￿ ict once one group has initiated
it. Does the other group also join in the con￿ ict? How much will the level
of con￿ ict be that each group chooses? What we ￿nd is that, under certain
restrictions on the parameters, it is the case that once con￿ ict is initiated, for
some levels of inequality, only the disadvantaged group engages in con￿ ict in
equilibrium. However, when levels of con￿ ict are high, both groups engage
in the con￿ ict. Later we use these results to uncover the link between
inequality and con￿ ict.
15The best-response functions of each group can be derived from their ￿rst







t) ￿ ri:k:(1 ￿ n
j
t)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿):k:(1 ￿ n
j
t):
This can be written as,
ni















. A ￿ 0 represents the
amount of con￿ ict group i will engage in when it initiates the con￿ ict and B
is the change in is level of con￿ ict when group j changes its level of con￿ ict.
Clearly whether B 7 0, will depend on 2￿ 7 I. The intuition for
the change in slope is the following. V i is a⁄ected by ni in mainly three
ways: a negative e⁄ect on present consumption, a negative e⁄ect on future
income through own savings and future wealth, and a positive e⁄ect on
future income through other group￿ s low savings and low future wealth. In
addition, there is the direct cost of engaging in con￿ ict. When inequality
is su¢ ciently high (I > ￿ ￿ 1
2), the third e⁄ect can be su¢ cient to induce
group to initiate con￿ ict. This is the one which depends on the level of
inequality, the other two does not. Moreover, as nj changes the marginal
e⁄ect (￿rst) is lower, that is, the marginal loss to current consumption is
likely to be lower. The third positive e⁄ect also depends nj but because of
the self damage factor, k, the rate at which the marginal bene￿t depends
is given by I(1 ￿ (nj=2)). Hence when I is not too large (I < 2￿), the
￿rst e⁄ect dominates in marginal terms and a high nj leads to a high ni
(positive slope). For large values of I, the opposite is true, and a high nj
makes con￿ ict less attractive to group i.







t) ￿ rj:k:(1 ￿ ni
t)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿):k:(1 ￿ ni
t);
which can be written as
n
j



















Since group j is the advantaged group, one can show C < 0 (using
Corollary 2) and D > 0.
When inequality is low (I ￿ ￿ ￿ (1=2)), we know from Corollary 2 that
none of the groups will engage in con￿ ict. In other situations the equilibrium
level of con￿ ict will be determined based on the best response functions of
the two groups. We discuss the case of high inequality, i.e. when I > b I
(we de￿ne b I later) but we ￿rst consider the case when (￿ ￿ (1=2)) < I ￿ b I,
which we describe as medium inequality.
4.1 Medium Inequality and Con￿ ict
We split the discussion of medium inequality in to two cases: (a) (￿ ￿
(1=2)) < I ￿ 2￿, and (b) 2￿ < I ￿ b I.
When (￿ ￿ (1=2)) < I < 2￿, the best response functions of the groups
are shown in the diagram below.
Insert Figure 1.
Before discussing the equilibrium we ￿rst describe the best response func-
tions.
Consider the best response function of group i given by (18). In Figure
1, it translates to an intercept A with gradient (1=B). Given the bounds
on the level of inequality, it is easy to establish that 0 < A ￿ 1 and 0 <
17B < 1. Similarly, the best response function of group j, has intercept
0 < (￿C=D) < 1 where C < 0 and gradient D < 1. Notice that in the
presence of non-negativity constraints on levels of con￿ ict, C < 0 implies
that the best response function for group j extends to the origin, with a
kink at ni
t = (￿C=D).
Further one can show that, given ￿ > 1, (￿C=D) > A and D < 1 <
(1=B). Hence group is reaction function is steeper than group js. This
re￿ ects the fact that group j has more to loose by escalating the con￿ ict and
hence would increase its own level of con￿ ict at a lower rate than group i.
We now describe the equilibrium. Group i will choose ni
t = A, when
n
j
t = 0 (from Corollary2). Reading from group js reaction function we see
that given ni
t = A, it is best for group j to choose n
j




t = 0) is the equilibrium. Group j, the advantaged group, does not
engage in con￿ ict.
The intuition is simple. (￿C=D) re￿ ects the level con￿ ict engaged by
group i that will be tolerated by group j. Hence, so long as the level of
con￿ ict (which is group is intercept term A) is less than (￿C=D), group j
shall not engage in con￿ ict.
Next consider the case where 2￿ < I ￿ b I. The implication of I > 2￿ is
that the slope of the group is reaction function now becomes negative. So
beyond this point, if the advantaged group engages in con￿ ict, the disadvan-
taged group will reduce its level of con￿ ict. But how will the equilibrium
levels of con￿ ict change? Figure 2 shows the reaction functions of the two
groups under this situation.
Insert Figure 2.
From Figure 2, it becomes clear, that it may be possible that in equilib-
rium, group j still does not engage in con￿ ict, whereas group i which was
already engaged in con￿ ict, now will increase their level of con￿ ict (which
18follows from (14)) since inequality has increased. Therefore the equilibrium
level of con￿ ict is given as follows.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium level of con￿ict, given medium inequality,
is (ni￿
t = A; n
j￿
t = 0).
Therefore, when one of the groups engages in con￿ ict and the other re-
frains from con￿ ict. This is, unlike Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and
Skaperdas and Syropoulous (1997), where both groups always end up en-
gaging in con￿ ict, although only one group might have started it.
4.2 High Inequality and Con￿ ict.
It is clear from the above discussions that whether the advantaged group
really engages in con￿ ict will depend on what is happening to the intercept
terms of the best response functions for both the groups, as inequality rises.
For us, the level of inequality where (￿C=D) = A, will become the bench-
mark for high inequality. Anything below that level will represent medium
or low inequality. As shown in the Appendix (Proposition A1), there exists
a level of inequality b I such that (￿C=D) = A.
We know (see equation (A1) in the Appendix) that, @(￿C=D)=@I > 0
and @A=@I > 0. In fact, when I > 2￿, it will certainly be the case that as
inequality increases, the intercept A will increase faster than the intercept
(￿C=D). Therefore, I > b I implies that (￿C=D) < A. Note that, unlike
the earlier cases, since b I > 2￿, B < 0. Intuitively this means that at
high levels of inequality, the disadvantaged group, will lower its own level of
con￿ ict if the other group engages in con￿ ict.
The best response functions for both groups would now be the following:
Insert Figure 3.
What about the equilibrium level of con￿ icts under high inequality?
19Solving the two best response functions (14) and (15), the equilibrium levels












where C < 0 and B < 0. Since (￿C=D) < A and B < A, we can be sure
that ni￿
t > 0 and n
j￿
t > 0. One can easily check that 0 < ni￿
t ￿ A ￿ 1 and
0 < n
j￿











t ) is a unique pure strategy equilibrium.18





At higher levels of inequality, the level of con￿ ict initiated by group i, is
greater than what group j can tolerate, that is, A > (￿C=D). Hence group
j engages in con￿ ict to counter the con￿ ict initiated by group i. But this
takes the over all level of con￿ ict to such a high that group i now ￿nds it
bene￿cial to reduce its level of con￿ ict, which then leads group j to reduce
its own level of con￿ ict, and the process continues until an equilibrium is
reached.
4.3 Inequality and Total Con￿ ict
So far we have solved for the equilibrium level of con￿ icts under di⁄erent lev-
els of inequality. This gives us the equilibrium in stage 2 of the game. Now
working backwards, using these equilibrium values, we shall determine what
will happen in stage 1, that is, whether groups will choose joint production
or own production. Note, that there is no con￿ ict under own production.
18There is a possibility of a cyclical equilibrium which we rule out (see Proposition A2
in the Appendix).
20This will allow us to derive the link between inequality and the over all level
of con￿ ict (given by (8)).
Low Inequality: When inequality level is low, such that I ￿ (￿ ￿(1=2)),
then none of the groups will engage in con￿ ict. Group i, the disadvantaged
group, would not initiate con￿ ict since the di⁄erence in inequality is not high
enough to merit engaging in con￿ ict, a part of the cost of which it has to bear.
Since the disadvantaged group does not initiate con￿ ict, the advantaged











t = 0, it implies that yi
t =
(Rt=2) > Y i
t and y
j
t = (Rt=2) > Y
j
t . Hence, both groups will decide to go
for joint production.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 For the level of inequality I ￿ (￿ ￿ (1=2)), the subgame
perfect equilibrium is (ni￿
t = 0; n
j￿









t ) = 1).
From Proposition 1, we know that there will be no con￿ ict in period
(t + 1) and hence both the groups will decide to produce the joint output,
that is, it will be the case that (ni￿
t+1 = 0; n
j￿










t+1) = 1), irrespective of the level of the inequality. Therefore,
for the rest of the discussions we do not explicitly state the subgame perfect
equilibrium in period (t + 1).
Medium Inequality: Next consider the level of inequality, I, such that
(￿ ￿ (1=2)) < I ￿ b I. Under this situation we had shown (Proposition 3)
that (ni￿
t = A; n
j￿















Di⁄erentiating with respect to I we get, @n￿
t=@I = ￿:￿=2 > 0, i.e. as the
level of future inequality increases, overall con￿ ict will also be on the rise.
21However, on the question of own or joint production whether both the
groups will decide for joint production or not depends on their initial level
of wealth. Since the initial level of wealth are same, using (5) and (9)
we can show that the su¢ cient condition for groups to participate in joint
production is (2￿A￿A2):Rt > 4wi
t. The equilibrium can be characterized
as follows.
Proposition 6 Given (￿ ￿ (1=2)) < I ￿ b I, and (2 ￿ A ￿ A2):Rt > 4wi
t,
the subgame perfect equilibrium is (ni￿
t = A; n
j￿










t ) = 1).
High Inequality: For b I < I ￿ I,19 the overall level of con￿ ict will be the






A + (￿B)(￿C) + AD ￿ (￿C)
1 + (￿B):D
: (19)
In the Appendix (Proposition A3) we show that (@n￿
t=@I) > 0. This
means that as inequality increases further, the level of con￿ ict also increases.
One may ask the question, whether total con￿ ict has increased or de-
creased under this situation. Note, here the disadvantaged group reduces
its own level of con￿ ict. Since in this case (￿B) < 1, the decrease of con￿ ict
by the disadvantaged group is more than made up by the increase in the
advantaged groups con￿ ict. Therefore, the overall level of con￿ ict increases,
by more than it would have, under the increased level of inequality if the
advantaged group did not join in.
On the question of joint or own production under high inequality, we shall
￿rst show that when inequality reaches I, groups will prefer own produc-
tion. This will also establish the case for a non-monotonic relation between
























t ; then I is that level of inequality at which n
j￿
t = 1. Since,
@n
i￿






















t . Since by de￿nition, at I, max(ni￿
t ;n
j￿
t ) = 1, this implies
that at I, ni￿
t = 1 and from (17), n
j￿
t = (￿:￿=4). Using (5) and (9), group
is payo⁄ from joint production is



















On the other hand group is payo⁄ under own production will be
(1 ￿ ￿)wi




Subtracting (21) from (20) and rearranging terms we get
￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿
￿:￿
4
)((1 ￿ ￿) + ￿:￿)
￿ Rt
4




since, (1￿￿) ￿ ￿ > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1. Therefore group i will drop out of
joint production before inequality reaches I. In this case even if we assume
that the level of consumption in period t for group i is higher under joint
production than own production, still group i will prefer own production.
The intuition is that the increased cost of mobilization is greater than the
bene￿ts the increased con￿ ict brings in the future. Similarly one can also
show that when n
j￿
t > ni￿
t , and at I, n
j￿
t = 1, group i will prefer own
production to joint production.
Note, since both groups engage in joint production at b I but decide for
















where for any group m, V m
S and V m
J represents its total bene￿t from own
production and joint production. This condition shows the level of in-
23equality in which atleast one of the group will be indi⁄erent between joint
production and own production.
We therefore discuss the possibility of two cases: (a) b I < I < e I and (b)
e I ￿ I ￿ I. When b I < I < e I groups will continue to be in joint production
and the equilibrium will be as given next.













t ) = 1).
However, when e I ￿ I ￿ I, clearly either group i or group j drops out
of joint production and since in our model own wealth is indestructible, we
get the following equilibrium.













t ) = 0).
The above proposition shows that under some circumstances there will
be no joint production. Hence, unlike other cases, although ex-ante there
is a possibility of con￿ ict, ex-post no con￿ ict will take place.
So where does all this leave us when it comes to the question about the
link between inequality and con￿ ict? As is clear from the above discussion
that until I, there will be no con￿ ict, since inequality is low. However,
beyond I, we know there is a positive amount of con￿ ict since the disadvan-
taged group now joins in the con￿ ict. Hence we see a discontinuous jump
in the level of con￿ ict. Con￿ ict now increases steadily with increase with
inequality until b I. Then from b I onwards both groups are engaged in con￿ ict
and the overall level of con￿ ict also increases. Therefore we see another dis-
continuous jump at b I. Now as inequality increases, con￿ ict again steadily
rises until it reaches e I. At e I, for group i, high levels of con￿ ict makes joint
production inviable. This can be captured in the following diagram.
Insert Figure 4.
24Therefore one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 9 The relationship between inequality and con￿ict is discon-
tinuous and non-monotonic.
The discontinuity between inequality and con￿ ict is at three levels of
inequality: I, b I and e I. Around each of these levels, there will be sharp
changes in the level of con￿ ict. To be more speci￿c, consider the inequality
levels (I +￿) and (I ￿￿), where ￿ is close to zero. Both the inequality levels
are quite similar but they exhibit di⁄erent levels of con￿ ict. For (I ￿ ￿)
there shall be no con￿ ict while (I + ￿) will lead to con￿ ict. Thus, we may
be able to ￿nd countries, with similar levels of inequality but very di⁄erent
levels of con￿ ict.
We would like to emphasize that the non-monotonicity in our model
results from a sharp change in the level of con￿ ict arising out groups prefer-
ring own production beyond a certain level of inequality. Although, Milante
(2004) also ￿nds a non-monotonic relationship, unlike ours, this is re￿ ected
in an inverted-U relationship between inequality and con￿ ict. Hence, in
his model, over a certain level of inequality, there is a gradual decrease of
con￿ ict as inequality rises.
5 Discussions
In this section we discuss changes to some assumptions so far made in this
model and how they impact the results. In particular we deal with three of
the assumptions: (a) the rate of savings are the same for both the groups,
(b) the proportion of ￿ self damage￿is equal for both groups, and (c) the issue
of perfect information.
Rate of savings. Suppose instead of having the same savings rate, con-




and rj = ri. This would mean that wi
t+1 = w
j
t+1, and therefore from the
25distribution rule it would be obvious that yi
t+1 < y
j
t+1. Group i again is the










then group i will initiate con￿ ict. The rest of the analysis will follow
through, so long as now our inequality measured the di⁄erence between the
two savings rate, i.e. I = (￿j ￿￿i). Along with this if we had assumed that
rj > ri the results in the previous sections will only be ampli￿ed. However,
if ￿i > ￿j and at the same time rj > ri, the results derived in the earlier
sections will now depend on which of these has greater impact. Obviously,
since the relative rate of return and the relative rate of savings are going in
opposite direction, the results in the earlier sections will be dampened. Since
we were interested in understanding the impact of inequality on con￿ ict,
distilling all else, we had assumed ￿i = ￿j.
Proportion of ￿ self damage￿ . Thus far we have assumed that the pro-
portion of self damage, k, is the same for all the groups and k = (1=2). As
mentioned earlier, for 0 < k < 1, all the results derived earlier will hold.
Here we shall discuss a few cases when k takes extreme values and when the
k varies between groups.
First, when k = 0 for both groups, the reaction function of group i
and j are, respectively, (derived from (14) and (15)) ni
t = (￿:￿=2):rj and
nj = (￿:￿=2):ri. Clearly, now both groups will engage in con￿ ict irrespective
of the level of inequality and the level of con￿ ict will depend on the rate of
return of the rival group. This is not surprising, since k > 0 makes it costly
for groups to engage in con￿ ict by reducing both their current and future
levels of consumption. The overall level of con￿ ict will be higher now.
Next, let k = 1 for both the groups. Recall that the way con￿ ict works
in this model is that under high inequality, the disadvantaged group wants
to reduce the amount of income devoted to savings by the advantaged group
26so that even with a relatively higher return, the advantaged group does not
receive a higher level of the output in the future. Now with k = 1, this will
be extremely costly. Under this assumption, so long as rj > ri, from (14)























Thus, group i, the disadvantaged group will be the only group involved
in con￿ ict and that too when I > 2￿. Group j, irrespective of the level
on inequality and group is level of con￿ ict, will not engage in con￿ ict. It
is easy to see if the level of self damage of group i is, ki = 0 and of group
j is, kj = 1, then the earlier result will be just ampli￿ed in the sense that
now group i will engage in con￿ ict irrespective of the level of inequality and
group j will never engage in con￿ ict. On the other hand, if ki = 1 and
kj = 0, group j will always engage in con￿ ict and group i will engage in
con￿ ict only when inequality is high, i.e. I > 2￿. In this situation, unlike
the standard results, it will be the advantaged group which will engage in
con￿ ict.
Information. Our model assumes that groups have perfect foresight.
Hence they can anticipate future inequalities perfectly. This, however, is
not very realistic. One way to bring in imperfect information in the model
would be to assume that both the groups know the distributions of rj and ri.
In that case the inequality will then be given by I = E(rj) ￿ E(ri), where
E(rj) is the expected rate of return for group j and E(ri) is the expected
rate of return for group i. Hence, (13), which shows the conditions under





















for group i and j respectively. One can easily check that the reaction
functions of the groups also remain same, except that now inequality is in
terms of the di⁄erence in the expected rate of returns. Hence, all the results
that we have discussed earlier will also go through for a case of imperfect
foresight. In the event of complete uncertainty, however, the analysis will
be more complex and will depend on the groups behaviour. If, for instance,
the groups presume that the rate of returns are going to be the same, then
obviously there will be no reason for con￿ ict arising from future inequality.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper was to analyze the interlinkages between inequality
and con￿ ict. In our analysis we ￿nd that although inequality may cause
con￿ ict, the impact of inequality on con￿ ict is not straightforward. Since
con￿ ict is costly for both groups, societies with low levels of inequality, in
our model, show no con￿ ict. It is only when inequality increases beyond
a certain level, the disadvantaged group initiates the con￿ ict. At higher
levels of inequality both groups engage in con￿ ict. Thus, our model is
able to capture both rebellion by the disadvantaged group and also the
suppression by the advantaged group. El Salvador and Guatemala are
examples where the state acting on behalf of the advantaged group unleashed
severe repression to curb insurgencies.
When inequality reaches extreme levels, the economy goes back to sub-
sistence levels as the high output joint production sector is not developed
28for fear of severe rebellion. For instance, the Bougainville rebellion, arising
out of a concern for the local environment and the lack of bene￿ts to the
local populace, led to the closure of copper mines, thus leading to a decline
in the income of the region.20
Our analysis shows the crucial role future inequality plays. Current
inequality will not lead to con￿ ict, if in the future there is less inequality.
On the other hand, current equality does not stop con￿ ict from taking place
if the future inequality is signi￿cant. For instance, the B.B.C. (April 16,
2002) reported: ￿ Millions of state employed workers in India have gone on
nationwide strike to protest against proposed changes to labour laws in the
country, which have been described ￿anti-worker￿ ￿ (Italics added). Clearly,
concerns about possible future inequalities had played a dominant role in
precipitating the strike. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, when the government failed
to guarantee the rights of Tamils (and also curtailed their access to higher
education) did the Tamil insurgency begin in earnest. The government
policies were seen as a potential source of future inequality where the Tamils
would loose out signi￿cantly.
This brings us to the policy implications of our results. Since the future
plays an important role in fostering con￿ ict, one has to put in place policies
that will reduce future inequality. For example, the warring factions in
Sudan have now decided to split future pro￿ts from the oil wells equally.21 If
such egalitarian rules can be institutionalized and implemented, then reasons
for con￿ ict will de￿nitely diminish. However, typically if one of the groups
becomes ￿ weaker￿(maybe due to exogenous shocks) in terms of bargaining,
the stronger groups tend to capture a higher share of the joint output and
that is when the problems start again.22 This may explain why so many
20See Bougainville-The Long Struggle to Freedom by Moses and Rikha Havini. Available
at http://www.eco-action.org/dt/bvstory.html.
21￿ SHRO-CAIRO Position on Sudan Peace Deal and Constitutional Panel￿ , Sudan Tri-
bune, May 7, 2005. Available at http://www.sudantribune.com.
22Infact the current hostilities in Sudan started after the discovery of oil in the south,
which none of the parties were aware of when signing the Addia Ababa peace deal in 1972
29peace agreements fail. What is implicit here is that enforceable contracts are
not viable and therefore parties cannot forge some kind of ex-ante contract to
avoid con￿ ict. If, however, we allow for long term interaction between the
groups, there may be a possibility of overcoming the incomplete contract
problem. What the structure will be of such long term contracts under
uncertainty is an issue for future research.
( Humam Rights Watch, 2003).
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33A Appendix
First we formally show the existence of a level of inequality, which clearly
demarcates high inequality from medium or low inequality in our model.
Referring back to Figure 2, A is the intercept term of group is reaction
function and (￿C=D) is group js, both of which are dependent on the level
of inequality. We de￿ne the lower bound of the high inequality interval as
the level of inequality at which (￿C=D) = A .
Proposition A.1 There exists a level of inequality, b I, where (￿C=D) = A.




























< 0 for I ￿ 2￿.
We know that for I ￿ 2￿; (￿C=D) > A, which implies that at I = 2￿;
f > 0. Now consider the level of inequality I such that A = 1. At this
level I > 2￿, and A = 1 > (￿C=D) (since D > (￿C) for all I). Hence for
I = I, f < 0. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem we can ￿nd
an b I 2 (2￿;I) such that at b I, f = 0, implying (￿C=D) = A. Further since
@f=@I < 0 for all I ￿ 2￿, b I will be unique. Q.E.D.
Next, we show that there is no possibility of a cyclical equilibrium, where
the level of con￿ ict ￿ uctuates between high con￿ ict and no con￿ ict. Figure
5, below, shows such a case.
Insert Figure 5.
We know that the disadvantaged group initiates the con￿ ict, and in this
case the equilibrium level of con￿ ict by group i would be A. Given this,
34group j, the advantaged group, reacts with such a high level of con￿ ict as to
force group i to drastically reduce the level of con￿ ict it engages in. Once
that happens, it may lead to a situation where in equilibrium, group j then
does not engage in con￿ ict at all, which then makes group i resume con￿ ict
at the level A, leading to a cyclical equilibrium.







Proof: We know that the disadvantaged group i, initiates the con￿ ict. So
to begin with ni
t = A. Given this, using the reaction functions, n
j
t = C+D:A,
which will lead group i, to choose ni
t = A + B:(C + D:A). From Figure 2
it is clear that so long as ni
t = A + B:(C + D:A) > (￿C=D), group j will
indeed choose n
j
t > 0. Note that both B < 0 and C < 0.
Therefore n
j
t > 0 if
A + B:(C + D:A) > (￿C=D);
which implies
(A ￿ (￿C=D))(1 + B:D) > 0:
For the high inequality case we know (A￿(￿C=D)) > 0, and therefore

























(1￿￿)￿. The only restriction so far placed on
the upper bound for I is that under high inequality ni￿
t ￿ 1 and n
j￿

































(1￿￿)￿. Hence in our model, there will
be no cyclical equilibrium. Q.E.D.
35Finally, we show that under high inequality, the total level of con￿ ict will
increase with inequality. Recall that in this case the disadvantaged group
reduces its level of con￿ ict and the advantaged group increases its level of
con￿ ict, with increase in inequality.
Proposition A.3 For all I > b I, (@nt=@I) > 0.
Di⁄erentiating both group￿ s best response functions (i.e. (14) and (15))

























































t ￿ 1; @A
@I >
@(￿B)
@I > 0 and
@(￿C)
@I > 0; @D








@I > 0 and
@ni
t
@I > 0, we can conclude @nt
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Figure 1: Best response functions of both groups under 





























t n  
i
t n  
Group js  
best response 
function 





Figure 2: Best response of both groups under medium 
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Inequality I ˆ I  
Figure 4: Link between inequality and conflict. 





















t n  
i
t n  
Group js best 
response 
function 
Group is best 
response 
function 
Figure 5: Possibility of a cyclical equilibrium under high 
inequality. 